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GP Funding — Editorial
eneral practice and the rest of the primary care team,
rather than specialist or hospital care, deliver the lion’s
share (90%) of healthcare.1 They also provide the anticipa-
tory care necessary for early and better management of the chronic
diseases that characterise modern industrial societies. A strong,
self-reliant primary care workforce increases quality as well as cost-
effectiveness.2 Thus, the way a country remunerates its primary
care workforce is vital. This is a good time to debate the options in
Australia — a federal election year in which healthcare is likely to
be a central issue. Changes to the administrative system can have
enormous implications for primary care. So far, planned changes
in Australia have been tentative, consisting of “add-on” improve-
ments such as payments to general practitioners (GPs) in addition
to the traditional fee-for-service arrangements. These include
Practice Incentive Payments (PIPs), which pay GPs who can
demonstrate using set protocols for managing some chronic
diseases (eg, asthma, diabetes), and Service Incentive Payments
(SIPs), which are specific payments for certain services such as
mental health care and vaccination. The complexity of administer-
ing these programs has prompted complaints from GPs, and in
response a Red Tape Task Force has been convened.3
Healthcare systems differ hugely from country to country, as we
see from the articles that follow. Reimbursement is perhaps its
most emotionally highly charged aspect and, however contentious
an issue, some system has to be chosen. Strong primary-health-
care-led systems like those in the United Kingdom4 (page 109) and
The Netherlands5 (page 110) use capitation systems as the basis of
paying GPs: they contract to assume the obligation to provide care
for a group of patients, and their financial rewards are independent
of the actual service and care delivered. In the former Yugoslavia,
with its socialist origins, remuneration took the form of a salary,
accompanied by planning (and restriction in the number) of GPs.
A more market-driven way of paying GPs is for GPs to “deliver”
before payment (fee-for-service), and in competition with each
other, as in Australia and the United States (page 113).6 Canada
(page 111) has opted for a combination of methods,7 and New
Zealand (page 106) is experimenting with a variety of interesting
models in quick succession.8
Fee-for-service
Financial incentives have a direct influence on GPs’ behaviour. For
example, in Belgium, 46% of GP–patient encounters are home
visits,9 whereas in The Netherlands this is only a small proportion
of GPs’ clinical activities. The population health status and infra-
structures of the two countries hardly differ, so the difference can
only be explained by incentives: under Belgian fee-for-service, a
home visit is chargeable. It also strengthens patient satisfaction
with the GP in a competitive environment. On the other hand, the
Dutch GP receives a capitation fee irrespective of whether the
patient is seen at home or at the practice (or not at all).
One problem with fee-for-service payment is that the way GPs
are funded is confounded by other innovations that Australia
should be considering, such as patient registration. Although
theoretically this could be separated from how doctors are paid
(capitation, for example), nowhere does this occur. A second
problem is that fee-for-service can be inflexible about who is
remunerated. This has held back the proper utilisation of nursing
in general practice in Australia simply because nearly all services in
general practice are ineligible for a Medicare rebate if provided by
nurses, even though for many services (eg, preventive10 or proto-
col-driven chronic care11) nurses may be better suited.
A third problem is the need for a business mind with fee-for-
service general practice. Many doctors want to practise unencum-
bered by a “small shopkeeper” role. One consequence was the
evolution in the 1980s of “entrepreneurial practices” (those whose
owners were more interested in making a profit than serving their
communities). These offered greater flexibility for the increasing
numbers of doctors who, wanting “just to practise medicine” and
happy to abdicate their commercial role, flocked there.
“Perverse incentives” reward some clinical activities better than
more valuable ones.12 For example, a GP who delivers many short
consultations will earn more than one who has fewer and longer
consultations — even though longer consultations are associated
with better attention to preventive healthcare and psychosocial
problems.13 Attempts to address this by providing less reliance on
fee-for-service (to the fury of the Australian Medical Association)14
with additional alternative payment systems (so-called blended
payments) such as PIPs and SIPs — funded by what might have
otherwise gone to increased fees — are probably only partly
successful. It is too early to tell if the complexity of administering
them is any better than the fee restrictions that arose to discourage
entrepreneurial practices. Do we need more fundamental reforms
of the GP system? What are the alternatives?
Capitation
Capitation payment and its associated patient registration (the
“list”) feels like clinical freedom for many GPs in the UK and The
Netherlands: the GP accepts an obligation to provide care for the
patients on the list and do what is in their best interests. It has
offered GPs a level platform to counter medicalisation, overdiagno-
sis, over-referral and spurious prescribing, without the tilt of
having to please the patient (something usually miscalculated in
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any case15). But there are disadvantages. A capitation system can
be a haven for laziness, because payment comes irrespective of the
quantity (let alone the quality) of care. GP-initiated activities —
like anticipatory (chronic disease management) and preventive
care — are particularly sensitive to this. Perhaps this is the basis
for the reforms currently under way in the UK NHS.16 Disciplinary
hearings against GPs in the UK and The Netherlands are, to a large
degree, occupied with GP failure to provide enough care — in
particular, failure to visit patients in a (perceived) emergency at
home. In Australia, the focus of disciplinary hearings is on
overservicing. The issue for capitation systems is deciding what is
enough care; for fee-for-service, deciding what is too much.
The solution
Blended payments (a mixture of fee-for-service and payments for
good practice) sound sensible (the best of both worlds), but there
is little evidence17 to reassure us we might not get the worst of
both: entrepreneurial GPs learning which mix of activities yields
the highest earnings, and government reacting by over-regulating
the system to avoid this.
GPs are at the forefront of evidence-based patient care. It would
be good if GPs’ financing systems were established by good
evidence, but little exists regarding the effects on service of
different payment systems (Box). Thus, we need to trial different
systems, not simply enact the latest political ideology. The current
flux in the Australian healthcare system is surely an ideal environ-
ment for such experiments. Possible alternatives would be pay-
ment systems that allow for patient registration, that include the
option of salaries for doctors uninterested in running a business,
and that encourage doctors to collect and analyse clinical data
about the services they provide. There is no doubt that such trials
would be hard to conduct politically,17 and perhaps randomised
controlled trials would have to give way to the pragmatics of quasi-
experiments. But we need changes to the system that are funda-
mental, rather than the lean-to sheds propping Australia’s current
archaic system.
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The evidence base for different primary care payment 
systems
• The best evidence comes from a Cochrane review.18 This is in need 
of update (last search date was 1997).
• The review compared four payment systems (fee-for-service, 
salary, capitation, and mixed), and accepted studies that were 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) or controlled before–after 
(CBA) studies if there were at least two measurements before and 
two after the intervention (nine studies were excluded for failing 
this test).
• Two RCTs (total of 98 doctors) and two CBAs (216 doctors) were 
included: all had potential biases in their methods.
• Compared with capitation, fee-for-service was associated with 
more services, tests and referrals to specialists, but fewer referrals 
to hospital.
• Compared with salaried payment, fee-for-service was associated 
with more services and more continuity of care, but less patient 
satisfaction with access to care.
• A more recent narrative review (conducted at an international 
conference on the subject) reached the same conclusions.19
